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NOTES AND COMMENT
THE MODERN TREND OF THE LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Now that we are engaged in a struggle for existence, under a
mode of life in which our individual liberties are guaranteed, it be-
comes necessary for us to forego to some extent many of the necessi-
ties of life, as a means to our end. Thus, we accept our rationing
laws with the attitude of a determined people. However, no society
has as yet attained the Utopian stage. There are, of course, the
hoarders, and the offenders of our laws. Unfortunately, the tendency
to be law-abiding is not something with which we are born. It re-
quires hard and ceaseless effort to be able to guide one's conduct in
accordance with certain ethical and legal standards. The temptations
of life may often be too strong. There are people that are impervious
to deleterious influences, while others are very easily affected by them.
Therefore, basic to any discussion of social problems is the proposi-
tion that society must utilize every scientific instrumentality for self-
protection against destructive elements in its midst, with as little
interference with the free life of its members as is consistent with such
social self-protection. 1
Thus society will utilize its powers of search and seizure to pre-
vent hoarding or excessive price raising today in an effort to prevent
destructive forces from making headway. Under the emergency price
control act, the administrator is authorized by regulation or order to
require any person engaged in business or who rents or offers for
rent or acts as renting broker, to furnish any information under oath
or to make and keep records and to make reports and he may require
any such person to permit the inspection and copying of records and
other documents.2 The War Production Board has the same power
to require the production of records and documents, as given to the
Office of Price Administration.3
I Theories of Punishment, condensed from Glueck, Principles of a Rational
Penal Code (1928) 41 HARV. L. Rzv. 453-482. Reprinted by permission in
HALL AND GLUECK, CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW, p. 19.
2 Act of Jan. 30, 1942, c. 26, 56 STAT. 23, U. S. C. A. § 50, App. §§ 901-
905, 921-926, 941-946. The administrator may also require by subpoena the
appearance and testimony or appearance and production of documents or both.
In case of refusal to obey a subpoena the district court may issue an order
requiring such person to appear and give testimony or to appear and produce
documents or both. Failure to obey such order is punished by contempt.
Under subdivision (g) of Section 122 no person excused from complying with
any requirements under this section because of his privilege against self-
incrimination.
3 "In the interest of the national defense and security and necessary to the
effective prosecution of the present war", the Act is intended "to stabilize prices
and to prevent speculative, unwarranted, and abnormal increases in prices and
rents; to eliminate and prevent profiteering, hoarding, manipulation, speculation,
and other disruptive practises resulting from abnormal market conditions and
scarcities ... to assist in securing adequate production of commodities and
facilities; to prevent a post-emergency collapse of values; to stabilize agricul-
tural prices . . ." and to affect other stated purposes, the War Powers Act of
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Constitutional concepts have been broadened, although not with-
out difficulty, so that today the Federal Government exercises greater
powers and exerts a greater influence over the activities of all persons
than at any time in our history.4
The powers germane to the Office of Price Administration Act
are: (a) the power to tax and spend to provide for the common
defense and general welfare of the United States, (b) the power to
regulate interstate commerce, (c) the war powers of Congress, (d)
the power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for
the carrying into execution the enumerated powers. If the power to
regulate interstate commerce is the source of the power of the Fed-
eral Government to regulate practically all prices for commodities and
services and to fix in specific localities, in order to make such price
fixing effective, strictly intrastate activities must be regulated and
controlled, and the commerce clause and implied powers must be
stretched to such an extent as to do away completely with any limita-
tion upon the power of Congress to regulate strictly intrastate ac-
tivities.'
Another delegated power of Congress is the taxing and spending
power. In the exercise of this power Congress may provide for the
common defenses and general welfare. 6 The act is, however, a valid
exercise of the war powers of Congress. The power granted by the
Constitution to the Federal Government to wage war extends to all
matters related to the winning of the war and to the employment of
all appropriate means to wage war successfully. It carries with it the
power to deal with all contingencies arising from the inception, prog-
ress and termination of the war.7 If in the exercise of its power to
regulate interstate commerce Congress may regulate intrastate activi-
ties which have a direct bearing upon interstate commerce, then cer-
March 27, 1942, was enacted. Pub. L. No. 421, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (Jan. 30,
1942).
4 Upon proper occasion and appropriate measure a state may regulate a
business in any of its aspects, including the prices to be charged for the com-
modities or services it sells. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 539 (1934),
where the Court stated: "Price control, like any other form of regulation, is
unconstitutional only if arbitrary, discriminatory or demonstrably irrelevant to
the policy the legislature is free to adopt."
5 Joseph W. Aidlin, Constitutionaliity of 1942 Price Control Act (1941-42)
30 CAujI. L. REv. 402.
6 Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548 (1937). The Emergency
Price Control Act makes no pretense at being an exercise of the taxing and
spending power of Congress.
7 Although the Supreme Court has held that the war powers are limited by
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments (United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255
U. S. 81 [1921]) in Paige v. United States it was held not to be so (78 U. S.[11 Wall.] 268 [1870]) and although it has been held not to extend to
intrastate matters, if power to wage war is to be effective, it must allow for
whatever legislation by Congress is necessary successfully to prosecute the war
and is no less inconsistent with the Fifth and Sixth Amendments than a state




tainly Congress may, in the exercise of its war power, enact legislation
of uniform application which is necessary to prosecute the war. It is
true that in the United States the fundamental right to security in the
home against unlawful search and seizure is protected by the Fourth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution.8 Congress has adhered
rather closely to this amendment in its statutory enactments concern-
ing searches and seizures. The grounds for the issuance of a federal
search warrant are restricted to searches for stolen or embezzled
property, for property used as the means for committing a felony, and
for papers or property used in violation of "any penal statute" or of
international obligations of the United States.9 Such warrants may be
issued by the United States judiciary, by state or territorial courts of
record, or by United States commissioners to be served by any officer
mentioned in its direction.10 The states are not bound by the amend-
ments to the Federal Constitution," but most state constitutions con-
tain equivalent safeguards. Accordingly, the New York State statute
on search warrants is very similar to the federal statute.12 No gen-
eral exploratory search and seizure of either persons, houses, or effects
can ever be justified, either with or without a warrant.' 3  The
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Bradley, said in Boyd v. United
States 14 that the search for and seizure of stolen or forfeited goods, or
goods liable to duties and concealed to avoid payment thereof, are
totally different things from search and seizure of a man's books
and papers for the purpose of obtaining information for evidentiary
purposes.
Whether, therefore, the nation in time of proclaimed emergency,
or during a state of war, may extend the scope of its searches would
seem to depend on the expansion of the number or type of penal laws.
s "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause supported by an oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized." The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses searches and seizures was not created by the Fourth Amendment, but
existed as a common law right before the Constitution was adopted but the
amendment established it as a Constitutional right which Congress itself cannot
violate. Angello v. United States, 290 Fed. 671, aff'd in part and reversed in
part, 46 Sup. Ct. 269, 269 U. S. 20, 70 L. ed. 145 (1923).
9 FED. CODE OF CR. PRoc. tit. 11, § 612, 98.10 Id. tit. 11, §§ 611, 617.
11 Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 (U. S. 1833). The clause in the Federal
Constitution prohibiting the issuance of a warrant, except on probable cause
supported by oath, restrains the issuance of warrants only under the laws of the
United States and has no application to state process. The Volant, 59 U. S. 71,
18 How. 71, 15 L. ed. 267 (1855).
22 N. Y. CoDE OF CR. PRoc. §§ 791-796.
13 United States v. Rembert, 284 Fed. 996 (1922). "Federal search war-
rants must not be used as a means for gaining access to a man's house or office
and papers solely for the purpose of making search to secure evidence against
him in a criminal or penal proceeding.. ." Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S.
309 (1921).
14 116 U. S. 616 (1885).
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Where seizure is impossible except without a warrant, the seizing
officer acts unlawfully and at his peril in acting without a warrant
unless he can show the court probable cause. If the securing of a
search warrant is reasonably practicable, it must be used and when
properly supported by affidavits and issued after judicial approval it
protects the seizing officer against actions for damages. 15 To justify
search and seizure without a warrant, the officer must have direct
personal knowledge through sight or other sense, of the commission
of the crime, by the accused. 16 A person who does not claim owner-
ship of the property taken cannot question the legality of a search and
seizure. The constitutional protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures is personal and can be availed of only by the person
wronged, and is not extended beyond the person whose individual
and personal rights are violated.
7
The history of this amendment took its origin in the determina-
tion of the framers of the amendments to the Federal Constitution to
provide for that instrument a Bill of Rights, securing to the American
people those safeguards which had grown up in England to protect
the people from unreasonable searches and seizures, such as were
permitted under the general warrants issued under authority of the
Government, by which there had been invasions of the home and
privacy of the citizens, and the seizure of their private papers in sup-
port of charges, real or imaginary, made against them. Such prac-
tices had received sanction under warrants and seizures under the
so-called writs of assistance, issued in the American colonies.' 8 Re-
sistance to these practices had established the principle which was
enacted into the fundamental law in the Fourth Amendment that a
man's house was his castle, and not to be invaded by any general
authority to search and seize his goods and papers. 19
In the Federal Court, evidence illegally procured by federal
agents, such as by unlawful search and seizure, is inadmissible. This
Court takes the position that the only way to discourage illegal search
and seizure by agents of the Government is to exclude from evidence
the matter so procured.2 0  New York and a number of other states
have taken the view that although the search and seizure may be un-
15 Walker v. United States, 125 F. (2d) 395 (1942).
16 Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 101 F. (2d) 774
(1939), modifying, Committee for Industrial Organization v. Hague, 25 F.
Supp. 127 (1938), certiorari granted, Hague v. Committee for Industrial Or-
ganization, 59 Sub. Ct. 486, 316 U. S. 624, 83 L. ed. 1028 (1939), nodified, 59
Sup. Ct. 954, 307 U. S. 496, 83 L. ed. 1423 (1939).
17 Schenck ex rel. Chow Fook Hong v. Ward, 24 F. Supp. 776 (1938).
Is See 2 WATSON, CoNSTITUTIONr 1414 et seq. "One of the causes of the
American Revolution was the blanket right of the English gove'nment to enter
and search the homes of the colonists and the framers of our constitution were
careful to deny the new government any such privilege." O'TooLE, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE (1937).
19 Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 6 Sup. Ct. 524, 29 L. ed. 746
(1885).20 O'TO0LE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE (1937).
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lawful, evidence obtained thereby is admissible; the injured party
being remitted to a suit for damages or to an effort to have the offend-
ing officer punished for his improper conduct. This in contrast to
the federal law as stated supra in which the United States Supreme
Court has adopted the view that the enforcement of the constitutional
guaranty requires the suppression of illegally obtained evidence upon
proper motion or objection.21
In modem times a main problem of unlawful search and seizure
seems to evolve around the question of the legality of wire tapping
and the use of detectaphones. In 1928 the Court held that the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments to the Federal Constitution do not protect a
citizen against interception of his telephone messages by wire tapping
or their use in evidence against him.22 The common law rule that
admissibility of evidence is not affected by the illegality of the means
by which it is obtained, subject to the established exception that ex-
cludes all evidence in the procuring of which Government officials
have invaded the right of privacy protected by the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments, was approved by the Court. The authority of Con-
gress to protect the secrecy of telephone messages by making them,
when intercepted, inadmissible in evidence in federal cases was ex-
pressly recognized, but the Court declined to extend the established
exception to the common law rule to cover intercepted telephone mes-
sages "without sanction of congressional enactment." The Federal
Communications Act was passed in 1934,23 that "no person not being
authorized by sender shall intercept any communication and divulge
or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or mean-
ing of such intercepted communication to any person".
The Nardone case 24 which followed, approved the further excep-
tion to the common law rule which the Court in the Olnstead case
refused to recognize without legislative sanction. Thus a policy ex-
cluding evidence of intercepted messages was held to be established by
Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act and is apparently
accepted in lieu of the policy admitting such evidence previously ap-
proved by the Court in the Olmstead case. In reply to the argument
that it is improbable that Section 605 was intended to hamper the
activities of federal officers in detecting and punishing crime the
Supreme Court observes, "The answer to the question is one of policy.
Congress may have thought it less important that some offenders
should go unwhipped of justice than that officers should resort to
methods deemed inconsistent with ethical standards and destructive
21 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 34 Sup. Ct 341, 58 L. ed. 652,
L. R A. 1915B 834 (1914).
22 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 48 Sup. Ct 564, 72 L. ed. 944,
66 A. L. R. 376 (1928).
23 48 STAT. 1103, 47 U. S. C. A. § 605 has been construed to forbid the use
of intercepted telephone communications in evidence in a criminal trial in the
federal courts. Nardone v. United States, 302 U. S. 379, 58 Sup. Ct. 275,
82 L. ed. 314 (1937).24 Ibid.
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of personal liberty." 25 When the F. B. I. began tapping intrastate
communications it was held that these things were within the scope of
the Federal Communications Act.
The New York State Constitution permits the tapping of wires s. 2
The question arises, whether or not this state constitutional provision
violates the Federal Communications Act. There has been no deci-
sion either way but it is submitted that it would be considered viola-
tive in interstate communications.
Where federal agents placed a detectaphone against a partition
wall of an office in which members of a conspiracy engaged in conver-
sations among themselves and over the telephone, evidence of con-
versations obtained by the use of the detectaphone was not inadmis-
sible on the ground that the use of the detectaphone violated the
Fourth Amendment, since it was not a violation of the home, the
detectaphone being placed on the outside.
27
In spite of the direction taken by the development of the law of
search and seizure the interception of telephone and telegraphic com-
munications should be sustained during a.period of war. All mea-
sures necessary and proper to aid Congress in carrying into effect the
determination of Congress to wage war would necessarily be sustained.
RosE KRAUS.
THE EXTRATERRITORIAL EFFECT OF EQUITY DECREES-FULL FAITH
AND CREDIT CLAUSE
A recent decision 1 brought into prominence the applicability of
the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution 2 to foreign
decrees.3 A sues B for specific performance in State X, and A ob-
tains therein a decree over land in State Y. To what extent must
State Y recognize the decree rendered in State X ? 4 This has been
the subject of much discussion and theorization among legal authori-
25 Ibid.
28 N. Y. CoNssT. Art. I, § 12 (1938). The Constitution of 1938 does not
change the rule that even though evidence in a criminal case is obtained in vio-
lation of law, it is not thereby rendered inadmissible. People v. La Combe, 170
Misc. 669, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 871 (1939).
27 Goldman v. United States, 62 Sup. Ct. 993, aff'g, United States v. Gold-
man, 118 F. (2d) 310, certiorari denied, 61 Sup. Ct 1109, 1111, 313 U. S. 1588,
85 L. ed. 1543 (1941).
1 Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287, 87 L. ed. 189, 63 Sup. Ct. 207
(1942).
2 U. S. CONST. Art. IV, § 1.
3 An order of a court as distinguished from a common law judgment for
money.
4 The law relating to the applicability of the full faith and credit clause as
to common law judgments is well-settled.
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